INTRODUCTION
The U.S. regenerative Environmenta Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) have been developed to enable the ISS to expand its crew size from three to six crewmembers. These regenerative systems include the Water Recovery System (WRS) and the OGS. The OGS includes the Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA), the Power Supply Module (PSM) that supports the OGA, and scars to accommodate the later addition of a Sabatier Carbon Dioxide Reduction Assembly (CRA). Earlier development activities are summarized in references 1-7. shown in Figure 2 . Feed water from the potable water bus enters the assembly through the Water Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) and flows through an Inlet Deionizing Bed, which serves as an iodine remover as well as a coalescer for any gas bubbles that may be present in the feed water. If gas bubbles are detected by the gas sensor downstream of the DI bed, the feed water is rejected to the waste water bus. This serves to prevent any oxygen that may be present in the feed water from mixing with generated hydrogen. Water is electrolyzed into oxygen and hydrogen in the Hydrogen ORU, which contains the electrolysis cell stack. Oxygen produced by the cell stack passes through the Oxygen Outlet ORU containing a water absorber, which protects the downstream hydrogen sensors from liquid moisture. The Hydrogen Sensor ORU monitors the product oxygen for the presence of hydrogen, which would indicate a problem with the Cell stack and signal the controller to shut down the OGA. The Rotary Separator Accumulator (RSA) within the H20RU separates the product gaseous hydrogen from the water which is re-circulated by the Pump ORU. The Nitrogen Purge ORU serves to purge system lines upon shutdown with nitrogen, and the Process Controller ORU is responsible for OGA System command/control and communication with the ISS Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM).
OXYGEN GENERATION SYSTEM
OGA OVERVIEW -A simplified schematic of the OGA is shown in Figure 1 and its installation in the OGS rack is The OGA is designed to generate oxygen at a maximum nominal rate of 5.4 kg/day (12 Ib/day) when operated on day/night orbital cycles, and also at a selectable rate between 2.3 and 9.2 kg/day (5.1 and 20.4 Ib/day) when operated continuously. At the nomina rate, the OGA can support oxygen needs for 4 crew, biological specimens, and atmosphere leakage, while at the maximum rate it can support 7 crew, biological specimens, and atmosphere leakage.
The assembly consumes 3573 W when processing, and 382 W during standby.
The product oxygen meets quality specifications for temperature, free water, dewpoint, and hydrogen content.
POWER SUPPLY MODULE OVERVIEW -The PSM is shown in the lower left of the OGS rack in Figure 2 . The PSM provides 10-55 amps current to the OGA cell stack during Process mode and 1.0+/-0.2 amps during Standby mode, with a minimum efficiency of 91% in Process mode.
The PSM is designed for 60,000 process/standby cycles, and a lO-year life.
ON-ORBIT OPERATION
The OGS has been activated three times since its installation in the ISS. In the first activation, the OGS operated in Standby (~2% of maximum oxygen production) for 6.8 hours and in Process (25% to 100% of maximum oxygen production) for 15.8 hours, which converts to approximately 13.4 Equivalent Full Power Hours (EFPH). During the second activation the OGS operated in Standby for 26.5 hours and in Process for 47.1 hours which convert to approximately 31 EFPH. The third activation production parameters have not yet been quantified, but the OGS operated between 25% and 100% production rates, n both cyclic and continuous modes for approximately 112 hours. The following sections describe the activations in more detail.
FIRST ACTIVATION, ON-ORBIT DAY 2007:192 (JULY 11) -When the first activation of the Oxygen Generation System (OGS) was attempted on July 11, 2007 it was understood that there could be some problems with startup.
The system had been dormant--apart from powering the controller, the recirculation pump, and some valves--since December 2005. It was known that the water in the hydrogen side of the cell stack would permeate to the oxygen side, and the nitrogen in the oxygen side would permeate to the hydrogen side. As a result, the RSA would be low n water and would likely cause a shutdown. Also, since water permeates to the oxygen side of the stack, this water would then be pushed into the hydrogen dome during the initial nitrogen purge of the cell stack, which would extend the needed time todry out the dome.
In light of this information, it is not surprising that there were 11 fast shutdowns caused by system conoitions during the attempted startup of the OGS. Fault limit overrides were mplemented to overcome many of the difficulties of starting the system. The timeline for the first activation is shown in Figure 3 .
Before the OGS can start, the hydrogen dome must be evacuated and dried of any water. The dome must be dry to allow for leakage detection, and enough time must be given to evacuate the dome to vacuum to evaporate any resident water so that the dome pressure will not rise above the pressure trip-point after the evacuation procedure is complete. Not enough time was allowed for this evacuation procedure in the software, so high hydrogen dome pressure caused the first two fast shutdowns.
As mentioned above, these shutdowns were caused by the fact that the system was dormant for so long that water accumulated in the oxygen side of the cell stack, which was then purged into the hydrogen dome.Thefirststartupattempts driedthe domeenough so that,by thethirdattempt, thedomehaddriedenough soanother highdomepressure failurewasavoided. A low RSA volume caused the third fast shutdown. This was expected to be a problem due to water crossover in the cell stack, so overrides were prepared for the RSA trip point and speed so that the system could continue with the startup procedure and eventually fill the RSA with water.
High water flow rate in the OGS water recirculation loop appeared to be the cause of the fourth and fifth shutdowns. However, it is speculatedthat it was not, in fact a high flow rate that caused the shutdown, but an anomaly with the Venturi used to measure the flow rate. Since the RSA speed was increased after the third shutdown to remedy the low RSA water condition, it was speculated that the extra speed in the RSA caused an ncrease in water flow. However, a similar condition was observed n ground testing, and was attributed to gas bubbles in the Venturi pressure taps causing errors in the readings. The solution implemented in the ground tests was to push high flows of water through the Venturi to purge the bubbles. This solution worked, and so the bubble theory was accepted.
In order to continue beyond this failure, the shutdown trip-point was overridden to a higher flow rate Higher recirculation flow rates were used during on-ground system testing, and there is no safety limit restricting the upper limit of the recirculation flow, so this override was not considered a problem. Later in the startup procedure, it was found that this initial high reading from the Venturi decreased back to expected Fevels.
After the fifth shutdown, Standby mode was achieved with RSA quantity nominal at over 328 ml.
After commanded Shutdown, the overrides for the RSA were removed.
The community may have thought that a water fill had been initiated during the startup, making these overrides unnecessary. However, the next startup attempt, number six, showed that the RSA was still too low and caused the sixth shutdown as a result. The low RSA quantity overrides were reinstated for the next startup attempt. Even though the RSA water level software limits had been overridden low for the seventh startup, hardware shutdown limits exist that measured the water level readings and prevented the recirculation pump from starting. Software fault limits exist for the delta pressure over the pump, and the pump speed, which tripped the seventh shutdown.
Previous startups had avoided this fault by increasing the RSA speed, which increased the delta pressure reading in the RSA. The higher pressure met the hardware Limit requirements.
Once the RSA speed was no longer overridden high, the delta pressure reading in the RSA was no longer high enough for the hardware shutdown limits.
The higher RSA speed override was implemented for the next startup attempt.
The eighth startup attempt was not only able to reach Standby operation, where a small amount of power is supplied to the cell stack, but was also able to reach an oxygen production rate of 25%.
However, when an attempt was made to remove the RSA speed override while the system was running, the system shut down due to the change in system operation caused by the removed override. For the next activation attempt, the speed override was not added to the override list.
Since operation of the cell stack was reached in the eighth startup, more water was consumed by the system, and hydrogen gas was now in the hydrogen side of the cell stack. Also, the system did not initiate a water fill, because at low production rates, less water is required by software to be in the RSA. As a result, at the ninth startup, the low RSA level was lowered even more when the recirculation pump started and pushed hydrogen gas from the cell stack into the RSA. This caused another fast shutdown, requiring the previously removed RSA overrides--the speed and quantity overrides to be reinstated for the next startup attempt.
After the tenth startup, the system finally initiated a water fill. However, there was still a speed override on the RSA, which forced the RSA to run at a specific rotational speed. Because there was a water fill, there was more torquerequiredto maintainthatspeed. Unfortunately, the RSAmotorcurrentreacheda hardwareimit and prevented the RSAfrom reachingthe requiredspeed, whichwas noticedby software(a tolerancefault) and causedthe tenthshutdown.An attemptwas madeto startthe systemagainwithoutchange,but the same shutdown occurred.
Activation was finallysuccessful with a complexset of overridesand a processto graduallyremovethese overridesafter activation was achieved. Afterthe 11 shutdowns, the systemranwellandwasableto runat 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% production. Once the systemreached 100%, it wasrunat thatlevel forseveral hoursuntil thewatersupplywasexhausted. To simulate a loss of power, Stop was commanded to immediately remove power from all effectors while at 50% production rate. When a restart was attempted, an RSA high level shutdown was tripped when the system was commanded to Standby operation. This occurred because when the system powers the cell stack, hydrogen production pushes a fair amount of water into the RSA. In previous startups, this failure was close to being tripped, but never caused a shutdown. A second attempt to start the system was made with no changes, but the same failure occurred. Therefore, the maximum RSA water level limit was temporarily increased in the software to accommodate this condition.
The system was started again with no problems, and proceeded to 25% production for about 2 hours. Next the system was set at day/night cycling at 100% production for about 10 hours to demonstrate it's functionality at that power level. It was then switched to 100% continuous production for another 8 hours.
Next, the system was commanded to standby since a long Loss Of Signal (LOS) period was imminent, and it was known that the system had nearly exhausted its external water supply. It is desirable to shut the system down manually before the external water supply is completely exhausted to prevent the RSA water level from being low for the next startup. After about 2 hours of standby operation, the LOS passed and the system was powered to 100% continuous production with no problems.
This power level was maintained until the system consumed all of its available water.
THIRD
ACTIVATION, ON-ORBIT DAY 2008:058 (FEBRUARY 27) At this time there was a comprehensive set of overrides in a procedure, including two additiona RSA high-quantity overrides identified in Activation #2. We had, however, reduced the RSA override commanded speed due to its inability to reach the speed commanded. Added to this was the potential increased loss of RSA quantity due to cell stack diffusion into the evacuated dome for 144 days since Activation #2. See the timeline for faults in Figure 5 : After fault #1 and #2, before which the RSA interlock with the pump did not set, the RSA speed was increased to the level which had previously provided a successful startup. This allowed the startup to progress further, but also resulted in fault #3 as the RSA differential pressure slowly decreased. A successful startup was enabled by a complex set of overrides with the goal of providing cell stack current and an RSA fil as soon in the startup process as possible. This was done by disabling as many built-in tests as possible and commanding Process at 25% rate instead of Standby.
After an RSA fill, Shutdown was commanded to re-enable built-in tests.
Standby was commanded with the procedural overrides as officially documented.
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF STARTUP FAILURES
The faults encountered during startup attempts are of five classifications. HIGH HYDROGEN ORU DOME PRESSURE -The first two faults in Activation #1 were because the dome pressure did not reduce to below shutdown limits after a startup nitrogen purge.
This was considered to be because of liquid that still existed in the dome. The problem did not occur after, but a permanent override extending the dome venting after a startup purge was implemented, since there was determined to be no innpact to Safety.
RSA DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INTERLOCK WITH THE RECIRCULATION
PUMP -If the differential pressure across the RSA at sensor 7331-3 cannot exceed 64.65 mmHg (reset limit) or drops below 56.89 mmHg, a hardware interlock prevents the recirculation pump from being powered. This is to prevent gas from entering the recirculation loop and being a source of combustion. Figure 6 shows a startup sequence from Activation 1, which did not reset the interlock (pump never turned). The initial part of the chart shows RSA operation at a lower speed to evolve dissolved gas. It's evident that the pressure reading of the two RSA differential pressure sensors 7331-1 (software only, and the quantity control sensor) and 7331-3 (hardware interlock) are not consistent. On occas=on as shown in Figure 7 , 7331-3 is as much as 5 mmHg below 7331-1. The pump interlock function of 7331-3 cannot be inhibited or modified.
The 7331-3 interlock does not result in a software fault by itself, but related software faults will result if the pump does not come up to speed within 15 (default) seconds. The first three activations have been achieved by overriding the RSA speed from default of 1500 RPM to 1783 RPM. This increases the differentialpressureby centrifugalforce towardthe outside of the RSA. The value is reducedafter successful activation toreducewearonthe RSA. Foractivation #3, it was also necessary to accelerate cell currentand RSA fil by inhibitingbuilt-intests. Figure 7 illustrateshow this assists in successful activation beforethe7331-3interlock canbetripped.
HIGH REClRCULATIONFLOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE FAULT -Activation #1 Faults4 and5 were dueto highdifferential pressure acrosstheflow sensor venturiFL 7531 1. Previous to thesefaults,the RSA quantity readinghaddippedto98ml. Sincethisvalueis filtered, the actual valuemayhavebeenlower. Thisis evidence thatgasactuallydidentertherecirculation loop duringourattempt to restartwithlowRSAquantity.The gascleareditselfaftera subsequent attempt (fault5).
HIGH OR LOW RSA QUANTITIES-There are problems withthe reference valuesof the RSAleakage detection.Thesefaultsprotect against leakageintothe recirculation loopfromprocesscoolant, or leakage outof the recirculation loop into the rack. The minimum reference valueforthe lowlevel faultis 327.74ml. If the measured RSAquantityis morethan98.3ml belowthis value,a lowquantityfaultwill occur. Another reference valuefor the highfault is setat the lowestactualRSA quantity, andthefaultwilloccurif thequantityincreases by 163.9ml whenthe systemis notin a fill mode.If the lowestvalueis 200ml,thefault will occurat 363.9ml. The limitsmustbe expanded for successful activation, and then resetto performtheir safetyfunctionduring OGSoperation.
TOLERANCE FAULTS -DuringActivation #1, the RSA speedwasoverridden to a fasterspeedthanitwasable tosupport.Thisresulted ina tolerance faultbetween the RSAcommanded andactual speed.Thedefaultlimitis 54RPM.Another tolerance faultwasencountered when the speed 'was reducedand the softwaredid not anticipate a delayto reachthecommanded speed.The toleranceis increasedto 200 RPM,and returnedto default aftersuccessful activation.
FAULTSUMMARY -The RSA7331-3interlock can be "fooled"into allowingstartup by increasingthe RSA rotationaspeed.Thisis at the riskof allowinggasinto the recirculation loop if the level is too low. The remaining software faultscanbe avoided by upto about 15 overrideswhichmust be removedafter successful activation.
Some of the overridesidentifiedas necessaryfor successful activation were made"permanent".These had no impacton operationor safetyfunction,and included recirculationloop flowrate high limit and transienttime for the dometo be evacuatedafter a startup nitrogen purgeof thecellstack.
Otheroverrides reduced the hazardcontrols for leakage detectiontemporarilyuntil successful activation. The controls werethenre-enabled by resetting the overrides aftera successful startupwasachieved.
PLANS FOR FUTURE SUCCESSFUL ACTIVATIONS
Only one potential issue with the OGS operation while in Process or Standby has been identified.
During an extended period in Standby, the heated hydrogen outlet tubing ncreases in temperature due to reduced product hydrogen cooling flow.
The temperature sensor is downstream of the hydrogen outlet heater, and they are both between the RSA and a regulator which maintains pressure against space vacuum. As soon as hydrogen flow commences the temperature spikes. The highest temperature seen was 4.3C below the default shutdown limit, which is based on the derated material limits. This value wil be monitored, but currently no changes are planned.
After the end of each OGS Activation, the RSA quantity has been maximized on commanded Shutdown. Since the WDS pressure drops as its accumulator quantity decreases, the RSA fill quantity also decreases At some point, the RSA quantity increase will be insufficient for a successful fill. At this point, software will attempt a second fill in 30 seconds.
Therefore, Shutdown is commanded after a confirmed RSA double fill.
Since the OGS dome is evacuated during extended shutdowns, measurable diffusion occurs from the OGS cell stack to space. The time between activations 2 and 3 was 144 days. Activations will be scheduled within approximately 90 days of the previous to minimize water loss.
The overrides for successful activation will be as baselined in the Activation #3 procedure, with the RSA rotationa speed increased to 1783 RPM. This speed contributed to success in Activations 1 and 3, and the procedure, including all overrides, was successfully used In the future, the RSA quantity may not be maximized when preparing for extended storage. This may be due to OGS failures, interface failures, or resource issues. It may therefore be necessary to fill the RSA from feedwater sources at the next operation opportunity using overrides.
An overfill may occur during this process. There are safety and operational concerns with this process that still need to be addressed. The reason that the OGS software does not allow an RSA fill until activation is complete is so that the gaseous composition within the RSA can be first confirmed to be pure hydrogen by hydrogen production and venting. RSA fill quantity is limited by design and software so that dissolved oxygen in the feedwater cannot create a combustible mixture within the RSA when evolved. Investigation into a method of recovering proper RSA quantity will continue.
HYDROGEN SENSOR ORU PURGE ADAPTER (HOP.&)
When in operation, the OGS produces oxygen with a high relative humidity. Heaters in the outlet stream and in the Hydrogen Sensor ORU prevent condensation from forming. When the OGS is powered down, the heaters are shut off, gas flow is restricted and there is a high potential for condensation to form on the cooling sensor dies inside the Hydrogen Sensor ORU. Sensor dies could be damaged if power is applied when water has collected on the dies. The Hydrogen Sensor ORU Purge Adaptor (HOPA) was designed and manufactured to purge moist oxygen from the Hydrogen Sensor ORU after OGS power-down. This purge prevents condensation from forming on the sensor dies and preserves sensor calibration life. The HOPA is made up of three tools: Evacuation, Inlet and Outlet Tools. Reference Figures 8-10 . 
HOPA PROCEDURE
The process to purge the Hydrogen Sensor ORU is quite simple. After OGS shutdown, the crew disconnects inlet and outlet quick disconnects from the Hydrogen Sensor in the OGS. Then the crew connects the HOPA Outlet and Inlet tools to the respective outlet and inlet quick disconnects on Hydrogen Sensor ORU. Reference Figure 11 . The HOPA Evacuation Tool is connected to the Portable Oxygen Apparatus (PBA) Extension Hose which provides a source of dry oxygen. The crew "evacuates" potential contaminants from the PBA lines for five minutes. Then they disconnect the evacuation tool, reconnect the PBA line to the inlet tool. and purge the Hydrogen sensor to remove any humidity. The HOPA IMPACT ON CALIBRATED LIFE -Currently, the OGS is operated approximately every 90 days for about a one-week period. Continuous operation is not possible because the Water Recovery System (WRS) is not onorbit to supply a continuous source of potable water. The OGS is only operated when potable water is brought to the space station via the Shuttle. It is desirable to power down the OGS when it is not producing oxygen so that valuable power is not consumed cooling systems are not taxed, and component life is not wasted on items such as on the 150 day calibration life of the Hydrogen Sensor ORU.
The calibration life of the Hydrogen Sensor ORU is determined by total power on-time, so as long as the Hydrogen Sensor ORU is powered, its calibration life is being used whether or not the OGS is producing oxygen. Once the WRS is operational on orbit the OGS may continuously operate unless maintenance is required. If shutdown is longer than a predetermined time, the HOPA wil need to be used to purge humidity from the Hydrogen Sensor• As mentioned before, the OGS produces oxygen with high relative humidity and without the heaters warming the Hydrogen sensors, condensation would form on the sensor die. Tests have shown the potential for damage to energized Hydrogen Sensors.
If water is on the sensor's die, electrolysis may result in physical damage or may cause the devices to indicate an incorrect level of Hydrogen. Without the HOPA, the Hydrogen Sensor could not be un-powered therefore using up sensor calibration life when operation of the OGS is not required•
HYDROGEN SENSOR ORU LIFE EXTENSION
The previous Hydrogen Sensor calibration life prior to life extension testing would have required that the OGS be shut down every 90 days for removal and replacement of the sensor (Reference 4). This 90 day life was established early in the development of the sensor based on historical testing results. Life extension testing was initiated due to the strong desire to extend the life and io conservecrew time and logistics.The life . extension potential looked positive because a qualificationHydrogenSensorORU had run for an extended periodof time beyondthe 90 day life andall threesensor diesstayedwithincalibration limits. Even though all s_x sensors were within tolerance after the 180 calibration check and one just outside tolerance limits at 200 days, it was decided to be conservative and extend the 90 day life of the Hydrogen sensor to 150 days.
Typical data for one sensor from the life extension test is shown in Figure 
